

THE ROLE OF THE AFRICA REGIONAL ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE FUND
IN TRANSITIONAL ELECTIONS IN AFRICA: A DESCRIPTIVE AND
EXPLORATORY STUDY OF THE CASE OF KENYA, UGANDA
AND CÔTE D'IVOIRE

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF CLARK ATLANTA UNIVERSITY
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS

BY

LINDA K. GEORGE

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

ATLANTA, GEORGIA

JULY 1998

R = iii T = 68

ABSTRACT

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

GEORGE, LINDA K.

B.A. BETHUNE-COOKMAN COLLEGE, 1991

THE ROLE OF THE AFRICA REGIONAL ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE FUND
IN TRANSITIONAL ELECTIONS IN AFRICA: A DESCRIPTIVE AND
EXPLORATORY STUDY OF THE CASE OF KENYA, UGANDA
AND CÔTE D'IVOIRE

Advisor: Dr. Mustafah Dhada

Thesis dated July, 1998

The study examined the relationship between assistance provided by the Africa Regional Electoral Assistance Fund (AREAF) and the type of democratic transitional approach being pursued by Kenya, Uganda and Côte d'Ivoire.

A descriptive and exploratory analysis was used to investigate the principal factors that influenced the ARAEF to focus on the selected countries.

The research found that foreign policy, rather than transitional approach, was the overriding factor that influenced ARAEF focus on Kenya, Uganda, and Côte d'Ivoire.

©1998

LINDA K. GEORGE

All Rights Reserved

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER		
I.	INTRODUCTION	1
	Statement of the Problem	2
	Organization of the Study	3
II.	LITERATURE REVIEW	4
	Democracy	4
	Democratic Transition	8
	Transitional Approaches	11
	International Assistance	19
	U.S. Foreign Policy	22
	U.S. Democracy Assistance	24
III.	METHODOLOGY	29
	Data Collection and Analysis.....	30
	Assistance Packages of Election Observation	
	Services	30
	Characteristics of Transitional Approaches.....	32
IV.	ELECTIONS IN KENYA - 1992	33
	The Kenyatta Era	35
	The Moi Era	36
	Transitional Approach	39

	Election Assistance	40
V.	ELECTIONS IN CÔTE D'IVOIRE - 1995	44
	The Houphouet-Boigny Era.....	45
	Henri Bedi/Political Climate.....	47
	Approaching Transition	48
VI.	ELECTIONS IN UGANDA - 1993.....	51
	Approaching Transition	53
	Election Assistance	55
VII.	FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	58
	Findings	58
	Conclusions.....	59
	Recommendations.....	61
	APPENDIX.....	62
	BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	63

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the Cold War, election monitoring activities have become more common around the world, particularly in Africa as democracies flourish. Former authoritarian regimes everywhere have come under international pressure and pressure from within (their own populations) to give way to freely elected governments. This thesis will investigate one avenue of support for transitional democracies that comes from the United States (U.S.) In the form of election monitoring and technical assistance. This research is significant because it will substantiate the claims made by scholars in the field, like McCoy,¹ of a shift in U.S. foreign policy toward Africa after the Cold War.

The shift in policy was evident in the early 1990s. Many African countries in transition, from single-party states to emerging democracies asked for two kinds of immediate short-term help from the United States Government (USG). The first kind of help requested was technical assistance in organizing elections based upon democratic principles, and second, international observers to attest to the freeness and fairness of elections. These requests led the United States Agency for International Development

¹Jennifer L. McCoy, "Election-Monitoring and National Sovereignty," Paper presented to The Council of Foreign Relations Project on sovereignty and New World Politics, Washington, D.C., 12 January 1995: 10:13.

(USAID) to set up the Africa Regional Electoral Assistance Fund (AREAF) as a rapid response, easily accessed, low USAID management intensity mechanism to support local and national elections in sub-Saharan African countries which were committed to free and fair elections.² The ARAEF provided:

... targeted focused assistance to governments and NGOs that included: electoral assessments, election monitoring, organizing and implementing elections, civic education and training, and organizational support for election commissions and indigenous Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs).³

The onslaught of former authoritarian countries embracing democracy created a new and specialized field of work for private volunteer organizations and governments, thus giving birth to a new growth industry, the election observation industry.

Statement of the Problem

The African-American Institute (AAI) was awarded the USAID contract to administer the ARAEF in cooperation with the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) and the International Republican Institute for International Affairs (IRI), with collaboration from The Carter Center at Emory University (CCEU). ARAEF was granted \$16 million to undertake a four-year project with a view to providing technical assistance and assistance for monitoring elections in sub-Saharan African countries undergoing transition. The ARAEF financed eighty-three programs in thirty-five sub-Saharan African countries and funded the monitoring of a total of thirty-

²*Africa Regional Electoral Assistance Fund: A Final Report on Democracy Development Programs*. Cooperative Agreement No. AOT-0486-A-2134-00. Submitted by: African American Institute, International Republican Institute and National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 20 September 1986: 237.

³Ibid.

one elections. Of the thirty-one countries that held elections, three received a substantial portion of the AREAF total funding and technical help. These were Kenya, Uganda, and Côte d'Ivoire. The researcher has therefore chosen to look at these three countries, one from each region (east, west and central) of sub-Saharan Africa. This study investigates the principal factors that influenced administrators of the AREAF to focus on these three countries. Did the type of democratic transitional approach instituted by each of these countries have an impact on AREAF funding activities? This question is the main thrust of this paper.

Organization of the Study

The first chapter deals with the introduction, statement of the problem and the organization of the study. The second chapter presents an overview of democracy and democratic transition, as well as democratic transition in Africa, and it also includes a discussion of foreign aid and technical assistance. The third chapter discusses the methodology, and data collection and analysis.

Chapters four through six summarize the recent political history of Kenya, Uganda, and Côte d'Ivoire and these countries' attempts at democratic transition followed by a review of how the AREAF was instrumental in providing assistance to each country. The final chapter includes the analysis of data, conclusions and recommendations.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

Democracy

Because elections are the first step in the attainment of a democratic government, any discussion of elections must begin with the definition of democracy. The classical theory of democracy, rooted in eighteenth century philosophy, defined democracy as:

... the institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions which realizes the common good by making the people itself decide issues through the election of individuals who are to assemble in order to carry out its will.¹

In his book *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, Schumpeter preferred an alternative and in his view a more precise definition. Schumpeter found this “classical” definition to be extremely vague and redefined the term as an “institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of competitive struggle for the people’s vote.”² Although Schumpeter’s definition is widely accepted by social scientists, some have chosen to adopt variations of it. Lipset, Diamond and Huntington emphasized electoral systems for political competition for votes. Lenski, Dahl, Bollen and Liu emphasized political equality as an example of what

¹J.A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1942), 269.

²Ibid.

a modern political system as a whole should include.³

Lipset, for example, focused more on competitiveness. In a text titled *Political Man*, Lipset defined democracy as a political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials, and a social mechanism which permits the largest possible part of the population to influence major decisions by choosing among contenders for political offices.⁴

Larry Diamond, on the other hand, defined democracy as a system of institutionalized competition for power.⁵ Huntington, also agreeing with the competitiveness definition, stated that the existence of civil freedoms such as speaking, publishing, assembling, and organizing are also necessary to political debate and the conduct of electoral campaigns. These civil freedoms, said Huntington, are in fact implied in this definition.⁶ The competitiveness model of democracy carries enormous support in the West, for it is widely accepted by individuals at all levels of society when determining if a system of government is democratic or non-democratic. This model is slowly catching on in other parts of the world.

Scholars such as Lenski approach the definition of democracy a little differently. Although not disagreeing with the competitiveness model, Lenski defined democracy

³Yong-chuan Lui, *Patterns and Results of the Third Wave* (New York: University Press of American, Inc., 1992), 9-10.

⁴S.M. Lipset, *Political Man* (Garden City: Doubleday & Company. 1963), 27.

⁵Larry Diamond, "Beyond Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism: Strategies for Democratization," *The Washington Quarterly* (Winter 1989): 142-143.

⁶S. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in The Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 7.

“not only by the extent of the electoral franchise but also by the existence of political liberties, which preserve the right of organized political opposition.”⁷ Still others prefer not to use the words “political freedom” and “political equality,” using instead such words as “responsibility,” “accountability,” or “elite-mass relation.” Dahl, for example, considered democracy to be a regime which ensures the continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens, who are considered politically equal,⁸ while Bollen defined democracy as a regime in which the political power of the elite is minimized and that of the non-elite is maximized.⁹ In contrast, Liu summarized democracy as citizenship, meaning that all citizens have the right to be treated by fellow human beings as equals when making collective choices, and that those implementing such choices have an obligation to be equally accountable and accessible to all citizens.¹⁰

The concept of democracy covers far more than just the competitive struggle for the people’s vote and a government’s responsiveness to its citizens. African scholars like Paul Ntungwe Ndue, Professor at the University of Yaunde II in Cameroon, cited that for Africa, democracy means majority rule and the representative institutions that go hand-in-hand with it.¹¹ According to Ndue, several things are needed in any African country to

⁷Liu, 10

⁸Robert Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), 2.

⁹K.A. Bollen, “Issues in the Comparative Measurements of Political Democracy,” *American Sociological Review* 45 (1980), 378.

¹⁰Liu, 10.

¹¹Paul Ntungwe Ndue, “Africa Turn Toward Pluralism,” *Journal of Democracy* 5, no. 1 (January 1994): 47.

ensure democracy. The first of these is the existence of a democratic state. The attributes of a democratic state are multiparty representation, freedom of the press and information, independent judiciary, free and fair elections and peaceful transfer of power.¹² The state must also guarantee separation of religion and state, as well as the separation of the state from political parties.¹³

The second attribute essential to democracy in Africa is a free and vibrant civil society. According to Ntungwe Ndue, no democratic state can survive for long without the foundation provided by a democratic society. The development of a democracy is not acquired overnight and may be eroded or even destroyed, if individuals are not vigilant in upholding the ideal of democracy. In Africa, as in any other region, safeguarding human rights, struggling against tribalism and the promotion of cultural pluralism in addition to the institutionalization of political power are key. In this context:

. . . institutionalization of political power means ensuring that leaders conform to regular and pre-established laws, with no provision for change to suit their personal whims of dynastic ambitions. They are thus compelled to recognize that they are only the representatives of the nation, and that sovereignty is not something that belongs to them.¹⁴

The third is the existence of several other surrounding democratic regimes.¹⁵ Because these regimes are fragile, it is often difficult for them to survive in a hostile environment. In Africa, says Ndue, the spread of pluralistic societies could help to

¹²Ibid., 49-50.

¹³Ibid., 50.

¹⁴Ibid., 51.

¹⁵Ibid., 51-53.

strengthen emerging democracies by rescuing them from isolationism. “Political pluralism may be consolidated all the more easily when it extends across several adjacent states.”¹⁶

Democratic Transition

The path to democratic transition in Africa is a complex issue. A number of factors both external and internal have influenced the process of democratic transition. Though consideration of these factors is well beyond the scope of this research, a brief review, however, will highlight some of the factors at play, particularly as they pertain to democratic transition in Africa in the context of foreign aid and technical assistance conditionalities.

Hippler, in a text titled *The Democratization of Disempowerment: The problem of Democracy in The Third World*, argued that African societies generally lack secure foundations. They have weak institutions, and they are economically dependent on the West and on world markets. These factors have left African nations vulnerable to wishes and commands of external actors.¹⁷ For instance, by the end of the Cold War, there was a strong desire for democratic governments to transform every non-democratic government into a democratic one.¹⁸ In an attempt to do so, observed Hyden and Bratton, the states

¹⁶Ibid., 54.

¹⁷Jochen Hippler, *The Democratization of Disempowerment: The Problem of Democracy in The Third World* (London: Pluto Press, 1995), 1.

¹⁸Ibid.

of the European Union and North America made development aid dependent on a country's efforts towards democratization.¹⁹

This desire for the democratization of non-democratic societies was a result of diminished competition between the superpowers.²⁰ The Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet Union led these two countries to define international security in terms of containment.²¹ As McCoy noted:

Internal conflicts were inflamed and prolonged by external intervention. Tolerance of non-democratic governments was justified by the interests of stability, security, ideological compatibility, and even economic growth.²²

After the Cold War, concluded Donald Rothchild at a conference at the Carter Center of Emory University, the superpowers were no longer concerned with enlisting African allies in the global struggle against one another.²³ As a result, the great powers withdrew, leaving the African countries on their own in a difficult economic and social environment.²⁴ With support for authoritarian rulers no longer forthcoming, a democratic

¹⁹Goran Hyden and Michael Bratton, *Governance and Politics in Africa* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), 4

²⁰Jennifer L. McCoy, "Election-Monitoring and National Sovereignty," Paper presented to The Council of Foreign Relations Project on Sovereignty and New World Politics, Washington, D.C, 12 January 1995: 18.

²¹*Ibid.*

²²*Ibid.*

²³Donald Rothchild, "Democratic Change, Insurgent Action, and The Changing Patterns of International-Peace Building," in *The Democratic Challenge in Africa*. Discussion Papers from a seminar, 1994: 27.

²⁴*Ibid.*

renewal became evident in some two-thirds of the countries in Africa.²⁵

Most scholars agree that the pressure for Africa to move towards democracy was not caused only by external forces. Internal factors played a role too--perhaps the most important role. African populations have by no means been passive in the face of economic hardship and authoritarian rule. Students, civil servants, workers and professionals have regularly voiced their opinions about popular participation and democratic transition in strikes, demonstrations, marches and boycotts.²⁶ Also, according to Ndue, opposition movements in countries like Gabon, Côte d'Ivoire, and Zaire all existed long before the collapse of the Eastern block regimes.²⁷

According to Schraeder, it is because of economic stagnation and decline, demonstrations against the continuous human rights abuses, and political repression that the ruling elites in Africa have been forced to negotiate with pro-democracy movements.²⁸ Schrader further stated that in countries where the state was insufficiently responsive to public demands and too frail to offer the necessary leadership in political and economic affairs, intense demands coming from disadvantaged groups at the periphery of society

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, "Toward Governance in Africa: Popular Demands and State Responses," in *Governance and Politics in Africa*, eds. Goran Hyden and Michael Bratton (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), 27.

²⁷Ndue, 46.

²⁸Peter J. Schrader, "Political Elites and The Process of Democratization in Africa," in *The Democratization of Disempowerment: The Problem of Democracy in The third World*, ed. Jochen Hippler (London: Pluto Press, 1995), 44.

sometimes led to state breakdown and armed conflicts.²⁹ This in turn ushered in an era of democratic transition.

Transitional Approaches

Richard Joseph, in his article “The Rebirth of Political Freedom,”³⁰ cites seven models of African democratic transition that have emerged in the early 1990s. First is the national conference. This is described as a civilian coup which has as its objectives the removal of a particular government, the establishment of a transitional government, and the formulation of guidelines for multiparty elections. Examples of civilian coups were seen in Benin and the Republic of Congo in 1990 and 1991. Togo, Niger and Madagascar also experienced demands from civil society that led to national conferences.³¹

Joseph’s second model is government change via democratic elections. This transition type was certainly an impressive accomplishment for many African countries considering that prior to the experiences in Benin in March of 1991, “No African country (excluding the island of Mauritius and Senegal, which experienced multi-party elections as early as 1963) has experienced government via multi-party elections.”³²

The third model is the co-opted transition. This transition type describes events in which there are supposed to be transitional elections, but the incumbent regime controls

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Richard Joseph, “Africa: The Rebirth of Political Freedom,” *Journal of Democracy* 2, no., 4 (Fall 1991): 14.

³¹Ibid.

³²Ibid.

all avenues of the transition-thus making it impossible for the opposition to have a fair chance at competition, openness and verification. Such was the case in Côte d'Ivoire under the leadership of Felix Houphouet-Boigny (1990).³³

The fourth is guided democratization. In this case, represented most clearly in Guinea and Nigeria, a military regime retains virtually complete control of the process. The transitions here are complex and deliberately prolonged.³⁴

The fifth transition type is recalcitrance and piecemeal reforms. In this transitional model, the regime gives little room for democratic reform. The small concessions that are granted are controlled very closely so as not to allow any large democratic openings. For example, in the case of Kenya prior to 1992, Moi would not concede to multi-party election; however, he did consent to minor concessions by releasing a few prominent detainees and instituting such reforms as the abolition of "queue voting" and the restoration of judicial tenure.³⁵

Joseph's sixth transition model is insurrections culminating in elections. South Africa and Namibia are examples of this transitional model.³⁶ They were both able to facilitate transition through armed conflict followed by negotiations.

The final transition model is the conditional transition. This occurs when elections are authorized, but for some reason are canceled or the regime does not accept

³³Ibid.

³⁴Ibid., 15.

³⁵Ibid., 16.

³⁶Ibid., 17.

the election results and reneges on concessions previously agreed upon.³⁷

While Joseph's article describes succinctly types of transitions that have occurred since the end of the Cold War, this study attempts to look at transition from the point of view of causation. Three of these approaches - modernization, civil society, and institutional - focus on studies about the conditions of democracy, while only one, the conflict resolution approach, focuses on the transition process itself.

Modernization: According to Hadenius, the basic tenet of the modernization school is that there is a positive linear relationship between economic and political development. That is to say, if economic development occurs, political development follows. The kind of economic development, said Hadenius, that can be measured by a country's increased Gross National Product (GNP) and the degree of industrialization and the degree of urbanization.³⁸ A social mobilization will then take place, according to Deutsch, one of the school's leading advocates. This social mobilization brings about a breakdown in social and economic barriers, or race and thus opens up the potential for actual involvement in mass politics.³⁹

Huntington, who opposed the modernization theory in his work *Political Order in Changing Societies*, stated that modernization does not diminish the conflicts in society or in politics; rather, it aggravates them.⁴⁰ The demand, he said, for change whether from

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸Axel Hadenius, *Democracy and Development* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 77.

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰Ibid., 80.

above or outside results in uncertainty and is generally regarded as a threat. This threat accentuates the need for group identity and the protection of traditional values. This of course does not give rise to social transformation or politically favorable social environments, but to mass confusion.⁴¹

Civil Society: The Civil Society Approach, as opposed to the modernization approach, argues that any effort to bring about democratic change needs a strong civil society to ensure that the transition ends with full or total democratization.⁴² According to Bayart, Civil Society is composed of those associations that are in direct touch with the State and have the capacity to break the State's intimidating powers.⁴³

Diamond is more precise in his definition, saying that civil society is a:

... realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules. It is distinct from "society" in general in that it involves citizens acting collectively in a public sphere to express their interests, passions, and ideas, exchange information, achieve mutual goals, made demands on the state, and hold state officials accountable. Civil society is an intermediary entity, standing between the private sphere and the state.⁴⁴

The civil society approach claims that civil society produces resources necessary for social groups and political parties to balance and limit state power, and gives citizens

⁴¹Ibid., 81.

⁴²Lui, 12.

⁴³Jean-Francois Bayart in Peter P. Ekeh, "The Constitution of Civil Society in African History and Politics in Democratic Transition in Africa" in *Democratic Transition in Africa*, ed. B. Caron, A. Gboyega and E. Osaghea (Nigeria: Intec Printers Limited, 1992), 195.

⁴⁴Larry Diamond, "Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation," *Journal of Democracy* 5, no.3 (July 1994): 5.

the opportunities to acquire the skills to use these resources.⁴⁵

Civil society also provides diverse avenues for democratic participation. It organizes citizens who can then begin to build and articulate social interests and differences of opinion. These are considered as important elements of the democratic political process.⁴⁶ By focusing on working from the grassroots up to influence policy, the civil society approach considers the development of civil liberties to be more basic to democracy than the development of political competitiveness.⁴⁷ According to Diamond, this concept of civil society can be seen in places like Southern Europe and Latin America.⁴⁸ Through the mobilization of the strong civil society in these places, political transition has moved beyond liberalization to full democratization.⁴⁹ In other places like the Philippines and South Korea, “intense mobilization by a wide variety of organizations and movements in civil society proved crucial in bringing about the demise of authoritarian regimes.”⁵⁰

Institutional: Unlike the civil society approach to democratic transition, McCoy argued that the institutional approach grants a great deal of power to external forces. Institutional environments have an enormous impact on the establishment of new

⁴⁵Lui, 12.

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷Ibid.

⁴⁸Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner, eds., *The Global Resurgence of Democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), xiii.

⁴⁹Ibid.

⁵⁰Ibid.

institutions.⁵¹ The need for countries to be acknowledged among other nations as having a legitimate government and to gain acceptance in the world community also affects the democratization process.⁵² In “Rethinking African Democracy,” Ake argued that the extent to which democracies succeed depends in part on the international donor community, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The West, he said, has already proven that the withholding of development assistance, aid and investments does encourage the support of human rights and democracy.⁵³

Conflict Resolution: Cheng, on the other hand, argued that the outcome of democratic transition depends on the conflict resolution approach or the strategic approach. This approach primarily deals with the strategies of the pro-democracy movement and the incumbent government. According to Cheng:

The success of democratic transition has been largely attributed to the political entrepreneurship of the new opposition, as related in its ability to set the agenda, to use extra legal methods in finessing repressive legal framework to shift the bargaining areas, and events to force the ruling elite to institute a new set of rules.⁵⁴

Huntington has also stated that most transitions are brought about by some form of negotiation “explicit or implicit, overt or covert, between government and opposition

⁵¹Lui, 9.

⁵²McCoy, 13.

⁵³Claude Ake, “Rethinking African Democracy,” in *The Global Resurgence of Democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 64.

⁵⁴T. J. Cheng, “Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan,” *World Politics* 41, no., 4 (1989): 474.

groups' resulting in some form of treaty or pact negotiation."⁵⁵

For example, the Angola-Namibia accords of December 1988 took the form of negotiations between Angola, Cuba and South Africa, brokered by the United States and the then Soviet Union.⁵⁶

Treaty or pact negotiations in many cases have built into the process external mediation. In many instances, said Clapham, these negotiations have to meet the moral expectations of those who mediated them, and who would be required to guarantee their implementation.⁵⁷ These expectations in turn are heavily influenced by the values of Western liberal society and calls for the creation of a constitutional framework that includes multi-party competition for electoral support and a respect for basic human rights.⁵⁸ According to Clapham, there are two ways in which this outcome could be achieved. In the first of these:

. . . appropriate topics for negotiation are restricted to the precise form of powers of the executive branch, the level of autonomy accorded to ethnic or regional sub-units, and the entrenchment of the rights of minorities.⁵⁹

Once these are agreed upon, open multi-party elections are held under international supervision, the results of which determine the leadership and composition of the successor regime. The settlements negotiated for Angola in 1991-1992 and

⁵⁵Huntington, 114.

⁵⁶Christopher Clapham, "Rwanda: The Perils of Peacemaking," *Journal of Peace Research* 35, no., 2 (March 1998): 194.

⁵⁷Ibid.

⁵⁸Ibid.

⁵⁹Ibid.

Mozambique in 1992-94 fell into this pattern.⁶⁰

Clapham described the second case as involving the formation of a broad-based coalition government. This is normally a transitional arrangement introducing a period of peace accompanied by appropriate confidence-building measures, such as the disarmament of the previously warring factions under international supervision.⁶¹ During this period, the formulation of a permanent constitution leading to multi-party elections and the installation of a new government could be established. Attempts to mediate solutions to the conflicts in Liberia followed this pattern.⁶²

Finally, the implementation of these agreements is to be guaranteed by the presence of an international peace-keeping force.⁶³ Normally but not always, the United Nations would provide this function. Peace-keeping forces would be available to help with the aid of external observers, to secure the conditions required for free and fair elections, to supervise the installation of the new regime, and to remain for a period of time, at least in order to reassure the losers of the elections that their rights would be respected.⁶⁴

⁶⁰Ibid.

⁶¹Ibid.

⁶²Ibid., 196.

⁶³Ibid

⁶⁴Ibid.

International Assistance

A growing number of Western donor organizations are seeking to nudge authoritarian regimes toward greater openness. According to Carothers, author of *Assessing Democracy Assistance: The Case of Romania*,⁶⁵ in the early and mid-1980s the USAID and the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) began to develop democracy related assistance programs, particularly in Latin America. Democracy assistance grew rapidly in the late 1980s and early 1990s, as the Cold War ended and the global democratic trend spread dramatically to Central and Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, Africa and parts of Asia.⁶⁶

For almost a decade, promoting democracy has been a priority of U.S. foreign assistance. Several hundred million dollars of U.S. funds have been devoted annually to encourage democracy, noted Carothers. The U.S. government is by no means the only actor in this growing field.⁶⁷ U.S. private foundations are increasingly involved, especially in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

Democracy promotion is now on the bilateral assistance agendas of many other Western countries, including Canada, Great Britain, Germany, Holland, Denmark, France and Sweden. It is now also pursued by a number of multilateral organizations, including the United Nations, the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation

⁶⁵Thomas Carothers, *Assessing Democracy Assistance: The Case of Romania* (Washington, D.C.: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996), 1.

⁶⁶*Ibid.*, 2.

⁶⁷*Ibid.*

in Europe, the Organization of American States, the Organization of African Unity and a host of NGOs.⁶⁸

Global Goals, Contentions Means: Issues of Multiple Aid Conditionality,⁶⁹ a policy essay issued by the Overseas Development Council in Washington, D.C., states that since 1989 most bilateral and multilateral aid donors have announced the addition of new priorities for some old objectives and have added other objectives to their agenda. Among these are poverty reduction, democratic government, respect for human rights, improved governance, environmental protection, and reduced military expenditures. All of these objectives require appropriate policies within aid-receiving countries. Thus, industrialized nations and multilateral organizations are considering ways in which to influence policy reform in poorer nations. Recently attention has turned to the tool of conditionality - linking aid to progress on policy reform - which was used extensively by aid donors throughout the 1980s to promote economic reform.⁷⁰

The use of democracy assistance is often tied to some form of conditionality, said Tomasevski. Her book *Development Aid and Human Rights Revisited*,⁷¹ stated that democratic conditionalities to aid have weakened the prior linkage to economic assistance and human rights, a concept that has been reduced, in recent years, to meaning multi-

⁶⁸Ibid.

⁶⁹Joan M. Nelson and Stephane J. Eglinton, *Global Goals, Contentions Means: Issues of Multiple Aid Conditionality* (Washington, D.C.: Overseas Development Council, 1992), 9.

⁷⁰Ibid., 10-11.

⁷¹Katarina K. Tomasevski, *Development Aid and Human Rights Revisited* (London: Pinter Publishers Ltd., 1993), 13.

party elections. According to Tomasevski, this occurs for several reasons:

- (a) ... donors are using 'democracy' and 'human rights' interchangeably, while in practice concentrating on support for multi-party elections. This may well result in the replacement of human rights by democracy and the loss of donor interest in human rights once elected governments are in place.
- (b) Democracy has been confined to electoralism where countries are labeled 'democratic' as soon as elections have taken place. The fact that democracy takes centuries to develop is forgotten.
- (c) It is assumed that such instant 'democracy' can and will guarantee human rights and fundamental freedoms⁷²

Another conditionality that international assistance is often tied to is democracy.

In "*Democracy, Confusion or Chaos: Political Conditionality in Kenya*," Grosh and Orvis argued that tying economic aid to democracy is a mistake.⁷³ Such was the case in 1991, when Kenya was denied economic aid until the country complied with donors' request for multi-party elections.⁷⁴ Grosh and Orvis suggested that instead of forced conditionalities, donors should carefully define the goals of political conditionality and separate them from economic conditionality by providing separate budgets for aid for each area.⁷⁵

Crawford's study, "Foreign Aid and Political Conditionality: Issues of Effectiveness and Consistency,"⁷⁶ also supports this argument. Crawford examined the implementation of political conditionality by four official aid donors (Sweden U.K., U.S.,

⁷²Ibid., 14.

⁷³Barbara Grosh and Stephen Orvis, "Democracy, Confusion, or Chaos: Political Conditionality in Kenya," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 31, no., 4 (Winter 1996-97): 46.

⁷⁴Ibid.

⁷⁵Ibid., 47.

⁷⁶Gordon Crawford, "Foreign Aid and Political Conditionality: Issue of Effectiveness and Consistency," *Democratization* 4, no., 3 (Autumn 1997): 69.

and European Union) in the 1990s. The study explored the aid sanctions taken globally to insure improvements regarding human rights and democratic principles and assessed donor policy practice along two lines - effectiveness and consistency.⁷⁷

The study maintained that the effectiveness of political conditionalities would increase only if the political reform required in order for aid to resume is precise. An increase in consistency could be obtained if the donors have little economic and strategic interest in a particular country and the donor government has the political will to implement them rigorously.⁷⁸

U.S. Foreign Policy

U.S. foreign policy towards Africa can be analyzed in three segments: economic, security and political reform, or democratization. On the economic front, the Congress and the Administration have advanced a new framework for promoting greater trade and investment with Africa - The President's partnership for Growth and Opportunity in Africa.⁷⁹ This emphasis on trade and investment, and the alleged (decline in commitments to development cooperation), have kindled a debate about what is the right mix of development assistance, debt reduction, trade incentives and investment promotion needed to support economic growth and sustainability development in

⁷⁷Ibid.

⁷⁸Ibid., 87-88.

⁷⁹Africa Policy Information Center (Washington, D.C.,: Africa Policy Information Center, 1998): 2.

Africa.⁸⁰ Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has listed the passage of the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act as one of the four top U.S. foreign policy priorities for 1998.⁸¹

On the security front, the Administration has continued to develop its year-old African Crisis Response Initiative by providing training and communications equipment to select African armies.⁸² Critics challenge the practicality of the plan because of unanswered questions regarding how much capacity building efforts can be turned into the mobilization of a regional African force to intervene in specific areas to promote peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, or other conflict prevention or resolution roles. The implementation of this initiative has, however, created a new discussion on U.S. security cooperation in Africa and raised important budgetary and national security issues.⁸³

On the third front, political reform or democratization, the Clinton Administration has not offered a particular framework for supporting African efforts to establish systems of more accountable governance guided by the rule of law and respect for human rights.⁸⁴ However, the importance of this problem in such priority countries as Nigeria, Congo and Kenya has forced analysts and practitioners to rethink their assumptions about the course

⁸⁰Donald M. Snow and Eueene Brown, *Beyond the Water's Edge: An Introduction to U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: St. Martin Press, 1997), 303.

⁸¹Africa Policy Information Center, 2.

⁸²*Ibid.*

⁸³*Ibid.*

⁸⁴*Ibid.*

of political change in Africa.⁸⁵ Recently the emphasis in these debates has shifted from the mechanics of multi-party elections to issues of legal and constitutional reform and the role of civil society.⁸⁶

In the recent Regional Summit on Africa that was held in Atlanta in May 1998, organizers stated that it is in U.S. national interest to have a stable, successful Africa. In order for Africa to become a full participating member of the global economy, the U.S. must help Africa in its search to build institutional capacity, promote democratic participation and promote respect for human rights. To achieve this goal, the U.S. must make democracy, human rights, and the rule of law a central part of its African policy.⁸⁷

U.S. Democracy Assistance

Democracy assistance gained prominence in the U.S. in the early to mid-1980s as one of the three main elements of the Reagan Administration foreign policy agenda (economic and security concerns were the other two).⁸⁸ To foster democracy assistance, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), a government-funded but privately-run organization committed to promoting democracy abroad, was established in 1984 with an \$18 million annual budget (today, NED's budget is \$30 million). USAID eventually replaced NED as the front runner for providing democracy assistance. However, NED

⁸⁵Ibid.

⁸⁶Snow and Brown, 327.

⁸⁷Democracy and Human Rights (Washington, D.C.: The National Summit on Africa: Synopsis for Policymakers, April 1998): 2.

⁸⁸Thomas Carothers, "Democracy Assistance: The Question of Strategy," *Democratization* 4, no., 3 (Autumn 1997): 111.

funding marked a new trend in democracy assistance.⁸⁹

United States Agency for International Development democracy programming got its start in the mid-1980s as series of programs in Central America related to elections, judicial reform, and civic education.⁹⁰ In the early 1990s democracy-related programming expanded and grew rapidly throughout Africa, Asia, Latin America, Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.⁹¹ Spending on such assistance by the U.S. government grew to approximately \$400 million per year, and internal bureaucratic structures were developed to institutionalize democracy promotion within the USAID.⁹²

U.S. democracy assistance is based on three main categories: the electoral arena, governmental institutions, and civil society. The main emphasis within the electoral arena is the holding of elections (presidential, parliamentary and local). Aid consists of technical assistance to electoral commissions to improve the administration of elections, support for voter education campaigns (implemented by local civic groups or in some cases by electoral commissions), and election monitoring by international delegations or domestic organizations formed for that purpose.⁹³ Another area of emphasis in the electoral arena is political party development. U.S. democracy assistance has included

⁸⁹Ibid.

⁹⁰Ibid., 112.

⁹¹Ibid.

⁹²Ibid.

⁹³Michele Schimpp, *The US Agency for International Development and Elections Support: A Synthesis of Case Study Experiences* Washington, D.C.: USAID Center for Development Information and Evaluation, 1993), 7-13.

programs designed to strengthen the main political parties, primarily through technical assistance and training on campaign methods and institutional development.⁹⁴

The secondary category, democracy aid for governmental institutions, seeks to help build democracy from the top down. In instances where democratic transition includes writing a new constitution, the U.S. often offers constitutional assistance, typically consisting of expert advice, conferences, exchange visits and seminars on constitutionalism and constitutional analysis.⁹⁵ The most common type of democratic assistance in this category is parliamentary assistance. Programs usually consist of training for staff and members of parliament and technical assistance for parliamentary libraries, research units, and public affairs offices. The goal is to strengthen the overall institutional capacities of parliaments and help them operate in a more effective manner.⁹⁶

Another area in this category is judicial reform. This area includes training of judges, prosecutors, and other legal personnel, technical assistance relating to court administration, underwriting the publication of decisions, providing law books and legal materials and supporting the establishment of arbitration mechanisms and other forms of alternative dispute resolution.⁹⁷

The third and final category for democracy assistance is civil society. In practice,

⁹⁴Joshua Muravchik "U.S. Political Parties Abroad," *The Washington Quarterly* 12, no., 3 (1989): 94.

⁹⁵Carothers, *Assessing Democracy Assistance*, 64.

⁹⁶Ryan S. McCannell, *Legislative Strengthening: A Synthesis of USAID Experience* (Washington, D.C.: USAID Center for Development Information and Evaluation, 1995), 19.

⁹⁷Thomas Carothers, *In the Name of Democracy: US Policy Toward Latin American in the Reagan Years* (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1991), 196.

U.S. assistance in this area falls within three categories - advocacy-oriented NGOs, media and unions. However, the most popular type of U.S. civil society assistance is for advocacy NGOs, such as human rights groups, election monitoring organizations, and environmental organizations.⁹⁸ A few examples of these civil society organizations are the National Committee of Election Observers (CNOE) in Madagascar, the National Organization for Civic Education and Elections Monitoring (NOCEM) in Uganda, the Institute for Education in Democracy in Kenya, and the Study and Research Group on Democratic, Economic and Social Development in Arica (GERDDES) throughout Francophone west and central Africa.⁹⁹ It is in this arena, (civil society) that the Africa Regional Electoral Assistance Fund has focused much of its attention and resources so that civil society would be strengthened.¹⁰⁰ The AREAF uses technical assistance as well as its ability to provide international election observers to promote democratic transition as well as encouraging the development of an engaged civil society.¹⁰¹ While focused on specific elections, AREAF also seeks to promote sustainability through providing electoral codes, private and public organizational frameworks, and broad-based participation in the entire process.¹⁰²

This brief literature review points to a crucial role that democracy assistance plays

⁹⁸Carothers, *Assessing Democracy Assistance*, 64.

⁹⁹Democracy and Human Rights (Washington, D.C.,: The National Summit on Africa: A Synopsis for Policy Makers, April 1998): 25.

¹⁰⁰Africa Regional Electoral Assistance Fund Final Report, 1-2.

¹⁰¹Ibid.

¹⁰²Ibid.

in moving a country forward on the road to democratization. The types of transitional approaches (modernization, civil society, conflict resolution, and institutional) are also of substantial importance to this study. One recognizes that these approaches to transition are ideal types and that democratic transitions do not exist in a vacuum. Democratic transitions often times occur simultaneously where two or more transition types overlap each other, making it rather difficult to distinguish the actual causes of transition. However, for the purposes of this study, the main causes of transition are identified in each country and linked to one of the four aforementioned transition types. The objective, therefore, of this study is to examine the relationship between assistance provided by AREAF and the nature of the democratic transition in the selected countries.

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

The research design and the method of analysis used in this study is, first, exploratory. Exploratory studies are appropriate when a researcher is examining a new interest or the subject is relatively new and unstudied.¹ Although democratic transition is not a new phenomenon and there are recent studies on transition, there has been little research on the African Regional Electoral Assistance fund and its relationship, to democratic transition. This type of study is typically done for three purposes: (1) to satisfy the researcher's curiosity and desire for better understanding, (2) to test the feasibility of undertaking a more careful study and (3) to develop the methods employed in a more careful study.² In this case, this study serves as a beginning point for future work to determine the efficiency and effectiveness of democracy assistance programs like the AREAF.

Second, this research is descriptive. The purpose of a descriptive study is to describe situations and events. Much of this research is founded on a clear description of democracy and democratic transitions in Africa, with particular emphasis on Kenya, Côte

¹Earl R. Babbie, *The Practice of Social Research* (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Co. Inc., 1979), 83.

²Ibid.

d'Ivoire and Uganda. In this case, the researcher will give a brief political history of each country and the events that led to transitional elections and involvement of organizations such as AREAF.

Data Collection and Analysis

Primary data were collected during an internship at the African-American Institute from January 1993 through August 1993; from the *Final Report of the Africa Regional Electoral Assistance Fund*, issued in 1996; *Africa Confidential*, *Africa Research Bulletin*; and from an independent evaluation prepared by Checchi and Company Consulting Inc. The secondary data were collected from scholarly journals and books.

Assistance Packages of Election Observation Services

Different services were provided to countries with varying degrees of success, such as election assessments, election monitoring, civic education and training and parallel vote tabulations. These services were categorized into assistance packages. Listed here are the major services offered by AREAF, broken down into three assistance packages. They are the basic, intermediate and full-service packages.

In the basic package, AREAF conducts a pre-election assessment in which the monitoring agency surveys the country's electoral framework (the role of the media, the role of NGOs and political parties and other civic organizations). The monitoring agency meets with the elected or appointed officials of the ruling party, the opposition party, members of the clergy, civic organizations, and local NGOs. The monitoring agency also reviews the electoral code and checks on the progress of the voters' registration process.

The monitoring agency then arranges for a group of international observers to monitor the election process.

The second package is the intermediate package. As in the basic package, the intermediate package also allows for a pre-election assessment and a review of the electoral code and checks on the progress of voter's registration. Some special features of the intermediate package are the seminars and workshops that focus on expanding party bases of support (for example, encouraging parties to promote the involvement of women and other neglected constituencies in the election process). The intermediate package also provides a foundation for political party training, platform development, campaign management and coalition building training for emerging political parties as well as the existing government. This package also includes external experts who train local and regional civic groups to take part in poll-watcher exercises in addition to a team of international election observers to monitor the election.

The third package is called the full package. This package features all the technical and electoral services of the basic and intermediate packages in addition to the provision of commodities (such as ballot boxes, registration cards, polling stations, fax machines, two-way radios, computer) and parallel vote tabulation. Parallel vote tabulations are "Projections of vote results based on a statistical sample of actual results at the voting sites."³ Observers are assigned voting sites in which to observe the vote count, record the results, and then call, radio, or fax in the results to a national computer

³Jennifer L. McCoy, "Election-Monitoring and National Sovereignty," Paper presented to The Council of Foreign Relations Project on Sovereignty and New World Politics, Washington, D.C., 12 January 1995: 11.

center. The sample projections usually come within two or three percentage points of the actual results.

Characteristics of Transitional Approaches

Each approach to democratic transition has specific characteristics that aid in identification. The characteristics of the *modernization approach* to transition are: industrialization, urbanization, economic development, social development, decentralized government, number of universities/students, number of printed magazines, number of newspapers, number of television sets, radios, etc.

The characteristics of the *civil society approach* to transition are: increased number of social groups, neighborhood organizations, special interest groups, local/regional organizations, labor unions, student organizations, and the formation of women's organizations or groups.

Characteristics of the *institutional approach* to transition are: an appeal by a donor nation to increase popular participation, the reduction or loss of aid from organizations like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and an increase in activity by international non-governmental organizations that foster political participation.

And finally, characteristics of the *conflict resolution approach* to transition are: national conventions, talks between the ruling party and the opposition, treaties/pacts, negotiations or bargaining and adoption of a new constitution.

CHAPTER IV

ELECTIONS IN KENYA - 1992

Kenya is a country on the east coast of Africa. It extends from The Indian Ocean deep into the interior of Africa. The equator runs through the center of Kenya. In 1995, the population was officially estimated at 30,522,000.¹ About 99 percent of Kenya's population is made up of Africans. Other population groups, in order of size, are Asian Indians, Europeans and Arabs. Kenya's indigenous Africans belong to about 40 different ethnic groups. The largest group, the Kikuyu, make up about 20 percent of Kenya's population. Four other ethnic groups - the Kalenjin, Jamba, Luhya and Luo - each make up between 10 and 15 percent of the population.² The official language is English; however, Swahili is widely used for communication between people of different ethnic groups.³

The modern era in Kenya politics commenced in 1960 when negotiations began to establish the country's independence from Great Britain.⁴ The British had been active in Kenya since 1895 when the country became a British protectorate. By 1920, Kenya had

¹W.T. Morgan, "Kenya," in *Africa South of the Sahara*, 27th ed. (London: Europa Publication Limited 1998), 549.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

become a colony of the British Empire.⁵ White settlers occupied most of the country's land that was suitable for farming, and later, Indian immigrants began to dominate retail trade.⁶ During this period, the land problems, rising unemployment and lack of a voice in the colonial government led to disaffection among most Kenyans.⁷

The Kenya African Union (KAU) was established in 1944 as a means to address the complaints of indigenous Kenyans related particularly to land issues in Kikuyu areas. Jomo Kenyatta (a Kikuyu and previously the KAU representative in the United Kingdom) was chosen president of the KAU in 1947, as a result of the slow pace of action on land issues. In 1952, a secret Kikuyu society known as the Mau Mau began a series of terrorist acts against British settlers.⁸ A year later, KAU was banned after it was mistakenly linked to Mau Mau rebellion, Jomo Kenyatta was imprisoned and a state of emergency was imposed.⁹

As Kenya began its transition to independence, the state of emergency in place since 1956 was lifted and two principle political parties emerged: the Kenya African National Union (KANU) and the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU). KANU

⁵Robert Maxon, *Struggle for Kenya* (Toronto: Associated University Press, 1993), 13.

⁶Robert Tignor, *The Colonial Transformation of Kenya* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), 15.

⁷Allen Rake, "Kenya," in *Africa South of the Sahara*, 27th ed. (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1998), 550.

⁸*Ibid.*

⁹International Republican Institute for International Affairs, "Kenya: The December 29, 1992 Elections" (Washington, D.C.: International Republican Institute, 1992): 2.

was dominated by the Kikuyu and Luo ethnic groups. KADU included primarily members of various minority ethnic groups.¹⁰

The Kenyatta Era

Jomo Kenyatta was released from jail in August 1961 and named president of KANU. KANU won national elections against KADU in May 1963 and in December 1963, Kenya established its full independence, with Kenyatta as Prime Minister. By 1965, political divisions began to arise within KANU between the party's conservative wing, led by Secretary General Tom Mboya, and the radical wing, led by Vice President Jaramogi Oginga Odinga. Odinga abandoned KANU and formed the Kenya People's Union (KPU), which accused the government of "promoting vigorously the development of a small privileged class of Africans."¹¹

One year later, during the by-elections, only nine of the thirty parliamentarians who joined the KPU were returned to parliament. Later that year, the upper and lower houses of parliament were merged in a unicameral house and in January 1967, Minister of Home Affairs Daniel Arap Moi was promoted to vice president, replacing Odinga.¹² The Kenyatta government moved Kenya into a de facto one-party state. Ethnic tensions grew, especially among the Luo, who perceived that their power was being usurped by the

¹⁰Norman Miller and Roger Yeager, *Kenya: The Quest for Prosperity*, 2nd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press Inc., 1994), 30.

¹¹Rake, 550.

¹²Ibid.

Kikuyus, inciting a series of violent Luo-Kikuyu clashes. During the same week, Odinga was arrested and KPU banned.¹³

Jomo Kenyatta, whose rule had become increasingly autocratic, died on August 22, 1978, at the age of 82. The Kikuyu-Luo domination of Kenya politics ended when Vice president Moi became president.¹⁴

The Moi Era

Moi was elected president of KANU on October 14, 1978 to complete Kenyatta's five-year presidential term. In legislative elections the following November, more than 740 candidates ran for parliamentary seats under KANU's one-party system. As with previous elections, almost half of the incumbents were defeated. Shortly after the elections, two developments signaled Moi's desire for closer relations with the United States: the appointment of Dr. Robert Ouko as Foreign Minister, and the arrival of a negotiating team from Washington to begin talks on U.S. access to Kenyan military facilities.¹⁵

In June 1982, following months of political disturbances and attempts to form opposition parties, parliament voted to amend the constitution making Kenya officially a one-party state.¹⁶ On August 1, a division of the Kenyan Air Force attempted a coup against Moi's government. Forces loyal to Moi quickly crushed the rebellion, which

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Miller and Yeager, 58.

¹⁵"Kenya: December 29, 1992 Elections," 4.

¹⁶Ibid.

lasted only a few hours, but more than 3,000 soldiers and civilians were arrested. The official death toll was 159; however, some Kenyan political parties and media accounts indicated thousands were killed.¹⁷

Following the attempted coup, the climate of fear and suspicion culminated in May 1983 with Moi's declaration that foreign powers had conspired to replace him with the Minister of Constitutional Affairs, Charles Njonjo. Njonjo later resigned his cabinet post and seat in parliament. Moi also called for national elections a year earlier than mandated. Only 48 percent of the eligible voters participated in the September 26, 1983, elections.¹⁸ Moi ran unopposed for the presidency and was re-elected to another five-year term.

During the following years, Moi was plagued by continuous student oppositions and demonstrations. In 1984, Moi met with student leaders in an effort to diffuse tension over a national youth service program and syllabus restructuring. In February 1985, following student clashes with police during which one student was killed and 65 were injured, Nairobi University was closed. Although the school reopened in April, disturbances in early 1986 again forced its closing for two months.¹⁹

Political unrest escalated again in March 1986 when the government uncovered what it considered to be a political plot by opposition forces. Early the following year, reports of increasing human rights violations prompted the international community to

¹⁷Morgan, 551.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Ibid.

focus attention on Moi's government. In March 1988, National Assembly election primaries were conducted using the queue system,²⁰ which led to international charges of intimidation and fraud in the process.²¹ Shortly thereafter, Moi demoted his popular Vice President, Mwai Kibaki, to Minister of Health and replaced him with the relatively unknown Josephat Karanja.²² In July, the National Assembly amended the constitution to extend the period of detention for suspected criminals from 24 hours to two weeks, and to give the president authority to replace judges without reason. These actions increased international human rights groups' condemnation of the Moi government.²³

Until the mid-1980s, the press in Kenya was among the freest in Africa; nevertheless, self-censorship, intimidation and repression by the government curtailed the free flow of information. The penal code allowed the government to ban any publication in the interest of public order, health, morals or national security. The foreign-owned newspapers accommodated the new political realities by engaging in self-censorship in order to avoid potential hostile government actions. Press freedom began to erode considerably in 1985 with numerous detention of journalists critical of the government. A once-lively press became cautious and self-censoring under threat of impoundment,

²⁰The queue system of voting was developed for use in societies where a high percentage of the population is illiterate, or where fraud involving ballots and ballot boxes has become so rampant that no confidence remains for secret ballots. Voters line up for the candidate of the choice at the polling site and are counted by officials; the results are entered on tally sheets for reporting.

²¹"Kenya: December 29, 1992 Elections," 4.

²²Morgan, 552.

²³Ibid.

permanent closure, violence or detention of its publishers and journalists.²⁴

Since independence, Kenya has received substantial amounts of development aid. In 1982 Kenya asked its main donors to provide additional balance-of-payment support to help to halt the serious economic decline. The U.S. responded with a \$77 million pledge.²⁵ In 1986 the World Bank pledged \$900 million and in 1988 donor commitment for 1989 totaled \$100 million. In 1989 the Federal Republic of Germany, Kenya's principal bilateral creditor, announced that it would cancel the total debit of U.S. \$435 million in return for increased Kenyan investment in projects aimed at protecting the environment.²⁶

Transitional Approach

Elections in Kenya came primarily at the urging of the international community. According to Miller and Yeager in *Kenya: The Quest for Prosperity*, at the end of 1991 bilateral and multilateral creditors suspended aid to Kenya for 1992, pending the acceleration of both economic and political reforms. In particular, the donors stressed the desirability of an improvement in Kenya's human rights record.²⁷

In early December 1991, Moi, called a special conference of KANU delegates in response to the international and domestic pressure for speedy reform. Moi submitted to

²⁴“Kenya: December 29, 1992 Elections,” 5.

²⁵“Kenya: A miracle Laid Bare,” *Africa Confidential* 33, no., 1 (10 January 1992): 4.

²⁶*Ibid.*

²⁷Miller and Yeager, 108.

these pressures and decided to permit the opening of a multi-party political system.²⁸

Soon afterwards, the national assembly approved appropriate amendments to the constitution. Several new political parties were registered in the beginning of 1992 in preparation for the elections to be held later that year.²⁹

Kenya's move towards democracy falls within the institutional approach towards democratic transition, and although this is an ideal type of transitional approach, it does in part describe the main events that caused the transition. The institutional approach holds that external pressure can bring about change, including the formation of new institutions. Such an occurrence was clearly illustrated by the international donor community's insistence that Kenya make drastic changes to its political and social climate if it desired international aid.

Election Assistance

The International Republican Institute and the African-American Institute worked together in providing election observation and assistance to Kenya. The AREAF provided a total of \$1,044,916 for both the presidential and legislative elections projects. The aid was used, first of all, to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the pre-election environment to determine the feasibility of organizing an international election observer mission in Kenya. The AREAF delegation met with individuals from the government of Kenya and with foreign diplomats, political parties, academics, media, churches and non-

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Ibid.

governmental organizations throughout the country. They superficially sought to assess the country's electoral framework as well as the role of the media, the NGOs and the political parties.³⁰ This analysis of the pre-election environment was encouraging, but the team reported concerns that "the overall process was significantly compromised by the government of Kenya on behalf of the ruling party."³¹

During the second phase of the Kenyan mission, the International Republican Institute (ISI) fielded a team of international observers for the general elections. The objective of the Kenyan election observer mission was to provide some deterrence to election day fraud, to offer international moral and political support for those engaged in the process, and to report to the international community on the conduct of the election.³² The presence of international election observers apparently did help reassure Kenyans that elections would take place, but did little to ensure complete transparency or openness. The AREAF funds were used for travel expenses to and from Kenya, travel within the country, and hotel and per-diem cost for sixty observers. Approximately 5.5 million voters (more than 65 percent of the registered voters) cast ballots for civic, parliamentary and presidential candidates on December 29. There were 713 candidates for the 188 seats in parliament, seventeen of which were uncontested. There were more than 7,000 polling stations, many of which were located in rural areas in schools, community centers, church halls, outdoor soccer fields, and village centers. According to

³⁰AREAF Final Report, 68.

³¹Ibid.

³²"Kenya" (Washington, D.C.: International Republican Institute), 29, December 1992, 41.

early reports by some observers, voting was delayed throughout the country, with a few exceptions. As reported by some observers, late starts in various places was caused by difficulty in the delivery set-up, unavailability of election materials, late changes in polling place locations, transportation difficulties, and inexperienced and/or insufficiently trained personnel.³³ The observers also noted that there were administrative irregularities throughout the country. For example, many ballot boxes were not properly sealed with the retaining bolt as required by electoral law. Party seals were intermittently used while Election Commission seals appeared to have been more frequently applied.³⁴

Problems with registration were also evident. Observers reported that some citizens were disenfranchised through lapses in the reproduction of the registration books used by the polling clerks. Although some were able to document their registration, in a number of instances witnessed by the IRI team, citizens' original registration forms were not readily available.³⁵ In another instance, observers reported that improprieties related to registration lists may have also occurred. Observers witnessed the purchase of voters' cards in Mombasa. The IRI discovered evidence to support complaints that registration lists were manufactured to allow for the importation of voters in Molo Constituency.³⁶ The team also noted that the slow start, the administrative irregularities, the lapses in provision of materials for the conduct of voting, and the registration problems all

³³Ibid.

³⁴Ibid., 45-47.

³⁵Ibid., Appendix 10, 2-3.

³⁶Ibid.

contributed to frustration for voters and election officials. There were also questions raised about whether or not the delays and lapses were systematic, or whether they were indicative of a focused effort to disadvantage a specific region or constituency.³⁷

Many observers were, however, impressed by the election-day enthusiasm of Kenyans. Overall, the citizens displayed heroic patience in the face of monumental delays, noted one team member. They demonstrated their commitment to a democratic transition, against a backdrop of deep-seated suspicion toward the government because of past election experiences and the government's reluctance to move from a one-party to a multi-party state. Though IRI believed that the electoral environment was flawed, the observers witnessed balloting that allowed most Kenyans to actively participate in political process. As imperfect as these elections may have been, they nonetheless constituted a significant and early step on Kenya's road back to democracy.³⁸

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸Ibid.

CHAPTER V

ELECTIONS IN CÔTE D'IVOIRE - 1995

Côte d'Ivoire spans 340 miles of the West African Atlantic coast between Ghana and Liberia. It also has common borders with Guinea, Mali and Burkina Faso. The country area totals 124,503 square miles, about half that of Italy or Japan.¹ About one-third of the country's population consists of immigrants from neighboring countries who have been drawn there by the country's relative prosperity.²

For some 20 years following its independence, Côte d'Ivoire had a high rate of economic growth - with gross domestic product (GDP) increasing by an annual average of 11% in 1960-70 and 6%-7% in 1970-80 - figures which, according to the World Bank, brought it into the ranks of middle-income developing countries.³ During the 1980s, however, the economy entered a period of decline, caused mainly by a weakening of the international prices of the country's major export commodities (coffee and cocoa) and a serious drought in 1982-84.

By 1994, however, the economy had recovered.⁴ A return to a strong and

¹R. J. Harrison Church, "Côte d'Ivoire," in *Africa South of the Sahara*, 27th ed. (London: Europa Publications Limited 1998), 373.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., 379.

⁴Ibid.

sustained economic growth is welcomed in any country, but is particularly important in Côte d'Ivoire because of its high rate of population growth. At about 3.6% per year since 1985, this west African nation is one of the fastest growing in the world, bringing the total population to an estimated 14.7 million by mid 1996. The rate of urbanization has also been rapid, with some 44% of the population residing in urban areas in 1995. One half of the population is less than twenty years old and a number of them are students and reside in Abidjan.⁵

The Houphouet-Boigny Era

Since independence in 1960, Côte d'Ivoire has had two presidents. The *Parti Démocratique de la côte d'Ivoire* (PDCI) had maintained a monopoly on political life in Côte d'Ivoire and was the only political party. As party leader since 1960, Dr. Felix Houphouet-Boigny was the sole candidate for presidency at every election until 1990.⁶

In 1989, as the economy continued on a downward spiral, Houphouet-Boigny invited a group of political leaders, critics and supporters, to Abidjan for what was called “five days of dialogue” in response to national discontent. Candid and sharp criticisms of the party and government over the five days conveyed a lack of confidence in the ruling elite. Participants in the “five days of dialogue” called for a more responsive party in the form of a multi-party system.⁷

⁵Ibid., 395.

⁶Robert E. Handloff, *Côte d'Ivoire: A Country Study* (Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, 1991), xxv.

⁷Ibid.

A few months later, on the advice of the World Bank, in an attempt to bring the economy under control, Houphouet-Boigny instituted strict austerity measures he thought would slow the fallen economy and bring in more revenues for the government. However, students took to the streets in protest of the announced wage cuts and tax increases. Demonstrators were also calling for a multi-party system of government. Often the protest turned into large scale demonstrations that at times turned into violent confrontations with police in the streets of Abidjan.⁸ In April and May 1990, army and air force recruits protesting the cost-cutting decision to limit their military service to a single tour of duty demonstrated in bases across Côte d'Ivoire. A group of armed air force recruits subsequently took over the international airport outside Abidjan for twelve hours. Police and firefighters also staged highly visible protests for higher wages. By mid-May Houphouet-Boigny had given up on the issue of military duty, agreed to higher wages for police and firefighters, and scrapped plans to increase income taxes.⁹ He instead appointed Alassane Ouattara, governor of the *Banque Centrale de l'Afrique de l'Ouest*, to head a commission whose function would be to formulate adjustment measures that would be both more economically effective and more politically acceptable.¹⁰ Most significantly, in 1990 Houphouet-Boigny and the PDCI legalized opposition parties and a multi-party political system. Opposition groups that had not been recognized officially before were now able to participate actively in the political

⁸Church, 374.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Ibid.

system. A number of new political parties were also formed and participated in the 1990 presidential and legislative elections.

Houphouet-Boigny died in December 1993, and Henri Konan Bedié, the president of the National Assembly, was declared president in accordance with the constitution. He served the remainder of Houphouet-Boigny's term and was elected president in 1995.¹¹

Henri Bedié/Political Climate

Building on the introduction of multi-party elections in Côte d'Ivoire in 1990, the country held its second multi-party elections in October and November of 1995. The major opposition parties boycotted the October 1995 election due to concerns about the electoral code's candidacy requirements and voter's registration irregularities.¹² Although the country's constitution provides citizens with the right to change their government peacefully through democratic means, the opposition complained that President Bedié and the Democratic Party of Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI), which Bedié led, used the December 1994 Electoral Code to place formidable obstacles in the path of political rivals.¹³ The *Rassemblement des Republicains*, the opposition party, maintained that Allasane Ouattara, a leading opposition rival of Bedié, had been banned from entering the presidential race because he did not satisfy the requirements of the electoral code with respect to parentage, residency, and citizenship.¹⁴ According to the U.S. State

¹¹Ibid.

¹²"Côte d'Ivoire: No Contest," *Africa Confidential* 36, no., 21 (20 October 1995): 7.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴"Otimism All Round," *Africa Confidential* 236, no. 7 (31 March 1995): 7.

Department's human rights report, the opposition also cited faulty voter registration procedures and unfair restrictions on demonstrations after the government issued a three-month ban on marches and sit-ins attempt to guarantee public order.¹⁵

Approaching Transition

Côte d'Ivoire's democratic transition falls under the civil society model and occurred in its first multi-party elections in 1990. The 1995 elections were Côte d'Ivoire's second attempt at making multi-party elections a permanent fixture. Working through the United Nations, the government of Côte d'Ivoire extended an invitation to the international community to monitor elections. As a result of the U.N.'s call, a joint survey mission was conducted by the National Democratic Institute and the African-American Institute in effort to determine possible program activities that both groups could undertake to support the Ivorian electoral process. The objective of this mission was to witness the elections, not to supervise or to certify them. Ultimately, says NDI:

. . .it is the Ivorian people who will determine the legitimacy of the elections. We sought to learn from the Ivorian people about the nature of their electoral process and its implications for the further development of Côte d'Ivoire's democratic institutions.¹⁶

The Côte d'Ivoire project received \$1,087,306 for the presidential, legislative and municipal elections held in 1995. In addition to travel expenses to and from Côte d'Ivoire, within the country, and hotel and per-diem cost for 43 observers, the aid was

¹⁵U.S. Department of State, "Côte d'Ivoire Human Rights Practices, 1996" (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1996): 7.

¹⁶"Preliminary Côte d'Ivoire Election Statement," Press Release of the National Democratic Institute, 29 November 1995: I.

used to design, conduct and implement a political party training program that focused on expanding party bases of support, encouraging parties to promote the involvement of women and other neglected constituencies in the electoral process, and sharing with Ivorian political leaders candidate selection methods used in advance of elections to improve party electoral chances.¹⁷ The first political party training seminar was devoted to campaign strategies and brought together sixty representatives from nine Ivorian political party groups and twelve representatives of major NGOs in Abidjan. The participants took part in role-playing exercises over a three-day period. They were asked to develop a campaign strategy, identify and cultivate resources, and select a candidate who would best present their team's goals to an imaginary electorate. The trainers and workshop moderators included elected officials and experts from Belgium, Canada, Malawi, Sweden and the United States.

Both AAI and NDI sponsored a joint delegation to the legislative election in November 1995. The joint delegation was comprised of forty-three observers from North America, Europe, and Africa. Observers included election officials, political organizers, academics, and members of professional and civic organizations.

In addition to international observer activities, AAI provided direct support to Ivorian NGOs involved in the electoral process. The AAI worked with the *Observatoire National des Elections* (ONE), an umbrella organization made up of six Ivorian NGO, to conduct pre-electoral voter register verification as well as local observer training and deployment. The AAI also provided assistance to ONE for the deployment of 180 civil

¹⁷AREAF Final Report, 20.

society members to participate in voter register verification. In addition, the groups worked with ONE when it spearheaded a training session for 120 local monitors from various areas of the country and then deployed more than 100 trained monitors.¹⁸

According to the final report, the delegation found that election day activities and tabulation during the legislative election were, for the most part, fairly transparent.

However, the delegation expressed concern over the inaccuracy of the electoral lists, the high number of non-distributed voter cards, and the inconsistencies and delays in the implementation of the court-ordered procedure intended to allow eligible voters whose names did not appear on the electoral lists to cast ballots.¹⁹ The monitors noted that these elections signified the importance of assessing the pre-electoral environment and analyzing the voter registration process and the enfranchisement of voters.²⁰

¹⁸Ibid., 92.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Ibid.

CHAPTER VI

ELECTIONS IN UGANDA - 1993

The Republic of Uganda is bordered by Sudan to the north, Tanzania and Rwanda to the south, Kenya to the east and Zaire to the west. Most of the country is a plateau about 4,000 feet above sea level. Thick forest covers parts of the south, while the north is largely savanna, with semi-arid areas scattered through the northeast.¹ Known as the “pearl of Africa,” Uganda’s reliable rainfall and fertile soil make it well suited for agriculture. Growth of cash crops-coffee, tea, tobacco and sugar-accounts for slightly more than half of the GNP.² Population density is directly related to the rainfall pattern, with the highest concentration in the areas of high rainfall. The Buganda, Banyakore, Buguso, Bakiga, Bunyoro and Luo are the largest ethnic groups in this nation, whose population exceeds 17 million. The rate of population growth continues to be among the highest in Africa.³

Uganda received its independence on October 9, 1962, and Milton Obote was

¹B.W Langlands, “Uganda” in *Africa South of the Sahara* (London: Europa Publications Limited 1998), 1051.

²Rita M. Byrnes, *Uganda: A Country Study* (Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, 1992), xv.

³Ibid.

elected prime minister by the Uganda People's Congress (UPC).⁴ In 1967, however, the constitution was annulled and a new one took its place. The new constitution established an executive presidency, making Dr. Obote head of state; abolished all traditional rulers and legislatures; and postponed national elections until 1971. Members of parliament grew very distrustful of Obote, who did not remain in power long. In January 1971, General Idi Amin, second-in-command of the army, seized control of Uganda.

Upon his takeover of the government, Amin made a number of gestures that were intended to gain the confidence of the Ugandan people. For example, he arranged for the release of 53 political detainees, toured the country, visited Britain and Israel, and announced a series of reversals in Uganda's foreign policy, established closer contact with Kenya and initiated contact with South Africa.⁵

It was not long before the Amin regime too began establishing laws that were not in the best interests of the Ugandan people. Amin suspended political activities and most civil rights and established a number of new government departments that were mainly in the area of state security. "To deflect public criticism and to enhance his domestic support, Amin adopted a controversial but highly popular program to Africanize the economy, by expelling more than 70,000 Asians from the country."⁶ The National Assembly was dissolved, and Amin assumed power to rule by decree. The entire

⁴Langlands, 1051.

⁵Thomas P. Ofcansky, *Uganda: Tarnished Pearl of Africa* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 44.

⁶*Ibid.*, 44.

population was brought under the jurisdiction of military tribunals.⁷ Amin served as president until 1979, when he too was overthrown with the assistance by the government of Tanzania. Multi-party elections were held in 1980, and Obote was returned to power until 1986.

Approaching Transition

The National Resistance Army (NRA) and Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, who had been fighting against the Obote government for some time, took control of Uganda in January 1986 by means of a military coup.⁸ One of Museveni's first acts as president was to form a broad-based government that included both civilian and military members and to establish a four-year timetable for drawing up a constitution and holding elections for a return to civilian democratic rule.⁹ Soon thereafter, Museveni announced that elections would not take place in 1989 as initially expected, but would be postponed for at least three years. Although political parties were not banned, their activities were officially suspended.¹⁰ In 1989, he again announced that he would extend his military government for another five years. He explained his efforts to extend his rule by claiming that further time was required to prepare a new constitution, organize elections, eliminate continuing

⁷Ibid.

⁸Ibid., 58.

⁹Langlands, 1057.

¹⁰Ibid.

anti-government guerrilla activity, improve the judiciary, police force and civil service, and rehabilitate the country's infrastructure.¹¹

“Lawlessness, banditry and indiscipline”¹² remained common in Uganda, especially in the north. In March 1986, an opposition movement supporting the armed overthrow of Museveni, the Uganda People's Democratic Movement (UPDM), was formed. Widespread opposition activity presented major problem for the government during the years 1987-1991. For example, large-scale uprisings led by Alice Lakwena attracted both peasant farmers from the Acholi ethnic group and former soldiers of the UNLA.¹³ In 1987, several thousand rebels were killed. In another incident, two opposition groups, the Federal Democratic group and the United National Front, formed an alliance aiming to overthrow President Museveni. Reports in 1988 of an aborted mutiny by members of Museveni's his own army, the NRA, indicated dissension within the ranks of his own forces.¹⁴

The 1992 Human Rights Report cited Museveni for publicly stating his resistance to multi-party politics, but openly welcoming such a system if it arose from the deliberation on a new constitution.¹⁵ Unlike Kenya and Côte d'Ivoire, Uganda was making the transition from military rule to civilian rule, thus illustrating the civil society

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵U.S. Department of State, “Uganda Human Rights Practices,” 1994 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1994): 8.

approach to political transition. Still, the enormous amount of time that President Museveni spent trying to curb dissidents, outbreaks, and to abort coups and dissension within his NRA army provided continuing evidence of civil dissatisfaction among a large cross-section of citizens ranging from farmers to soldiers.¹⁶ After Museveni reneged on his promise to restore civilian rule, a Constitutional Commission was finally organized to draft a tentative constitution. An election was held in 1994 to elect a Constituent Assembly that was to be responsible for debating and adopting the constitution.

Election Assistance

Prior to beginning assistance, a joint assessment team of IRI and AAI representatives went to Uganda for a period of two weeks in 1993. The Uganda project received \$1,280,447 for the Constitutional Assembly and the national elections that were to be held in 1996. According to the AREAF Final Report, the visiting assessment team consulted with the U.S. Embassy, USAID, the government of Uganda, NRA members, NRA Constitutional Commission members, the chair and deputy chair of the Constituent Assembly, opposition party members, and human rights and community leaders. Other relevant groups such as members of the press, academia, NGOs, and representatives from donor nations were also consulted to determine the best way to proceed in developing and implementing overall election support. The recommendations were to provide electoral assistance in the form of civic education and domestic monitoring. This support was intended to provide a foundation for national elections. The funds were used not only for

¹⁶Alan Rake, "Uganda" in *Africa South of the Sahara* (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1997), 1019.

election monitoring, but also for a series of seven seminars that facilitated the active involvement of Ugandan citizens in the constitution-making process. The AAI organized seminars, conferences, workshops, publications, and forums on all aspects of democratic institution building. The forums provided interested parties with avenues to express their ideas and have those ideas transmitted to the Constituent Assembly. Seminar participants were also asked to host discussions in their hometowns or villages about the relevance of the constitution in order to promote a greater understanding of constitutional issues at the grassroots level.

In preparation for the election, the IRI implemented a program of poll-watcher training for candidates' agents as well as a civic education program for political parties. To assist political parties in their own internal development capabilities, the IRI conducted a workshop with representatives from the parties, the NRM, and NGOs to discuss how Uganda should move toward democracy. This training concentrated on how political parties can more effectively use the avenues open to them to engage in political debate under the current government restrictions. The IRI also conducted regional candidate poll-watcher seminars to train candidates and their agents about the monitoring and poll-watching provisions of Uganda's electoral law and to provide organizational support to the parties and coordinated poll-watching activities.

The IRI and AAI administered an assistance program that included training Ugandan election monitors and civic education trainers and providing technical assistance and equipment (fax machines, two-way radios, antennas) to the independent election commission. The assistance team worked with two umbrella groups, the Uganda Joint

Christian Council (UJCC), composed of the Catholic Church and most of the Protestant denominations, and the National Organization for Civic Education and Monitoring (NOCEM), which comprised approximately 13 NGOs. Training workshops were organized, and a total of 16,000 local election monitors and approximately 4,000 civic education trainers participated in these sessions. The trainees were deployed during the campaign at candidates' meetings (the only sanctioned forums for campaigning), and at the polls for voting and vote counting.

Approximately two weeks prior to the elections, AAI trained UJCC monitors to conduct a statistical certification of results through a parallel vote tabulation (PVT). The UJCC conducted the PVT in thirteen of the 214 elections for the Constituent Assembly. Significantly, there was a 100 percent correspondent between the PVT and projected winners and the official winner in all thirteen elections.

The international observer delegation reported that the Constituent Assembly election was not without flaws. But while there were some problems related to voter registration, registration certificates, the late announcement of the polling places, and the failure to display voter registers before the election in some areas of the country, there was no evidence of any systematic attempt to manipulate the outcome of this exercise.

CHAPTER VII

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Findings

The purpose of this study was to investigate the principal factors that influenced the administrators of the AREAF to focus on Kenya, Uganda and Côte d'Ivoire. The study set out to achieve the following objective: To examine the relationship between assistance provided by AREAF and democratic transitions, in the selected countries.

First, in an examination of thirty-one countries, the type of transition each country was undergoing, and the type of assistance package offered, there seems to be a pattern of assistance package offered, there seems to be a pattern of assistance based on the transitional approach. The modernization transitional approach was not accounted for in any of the thirty-one countries, while the strategic approach only appeared once. However, Table 1 shows nineteen countries with civil society transition. Two countries received the full service package, while twelve received the intermediate package and five received the basic package. In the case of the institutional transition approach, there were one full service package, three intermediate packages and only one basic package.

A closer look at the selected countries reveals even more details. In Kenya, where the transitional approach was institutional (grant compliance), the assistance package was basic; a pre-electoral assessment and the election monitoring process. In Uganda, where

the transition followed the civil society approach, AREAF rendered a full assistance package. In this package, all of the services were offered. Finally, in the case of Côte d'Ivoire, where the transitional approach was also the civil society approach, the assistance package received was basic. The relationship between transition type and type of assistance in the selected countries remains unclear. However, it does not appear that the type of transitional approach had an impact on AREAF funding activities in the selected countries.

Conclusions

What is apparent, however, is the significance of the role that each country plays in its own region (west, central and east) and how that role falls in line with U.S. foreign policy towards maintaining economic stability, security, and encouraging democratization efforts in the region. The AREAF was developed by USAID to respond quickly to the changes occurring in sub-Saharan Africa. The services provided by the AREAF were a means of effectively promoting U.S. foreign policy in the region. Both Côte d'Ivoire and Uganda are regarded as regional stabilizers and provide examples of good governance. As noted by Ntungwe Ndue, fragile democratic states need the support of other democratic states to survive. Because the Clinton Administration has yet to offer a particular framework for supporting African efforts to establish more accountable governance, it is of course in the best interests of the U.S. to assist the efforts of those successfully reforming states. It is equally as important that Kenya receive U.S. encouragement in terms of democratic reform and state observation of human rights.

Stability in Kenya is important not only because of economic interests, but also because the U.S. still depends on access to Kenyan ports and airfields for various military planning scenarios involving the deployment of U.S. forces in the Gulf as well as east Africa. Stability in the region leads to economic stability and greater economic cooperation between the countries in the regions and also facilitates trade and investment opportunities for foreign investors.

President Clinton's trip to Africa in March, 1998, was an attempt to take advantage of the economic as well as the democratic reforms occurring on the continent. "We have a growing stake in Africa's success,"¹ said Brian Atwood, administrator of USAID. Africa is a market of 700 million people, and thus far, trade with the continent already eclipses trade with the former Soviet Union by 20%. There are some 100,000 American jobs directly tied to exports to Africa. Although trade with Africa is only one percent of all U.S. trade, seven percent (7%) of Africa's imports are American. There is clearly economic opportunity for both the U.S. and Africa here. Despite these enormous possibilities for both countries, these prospects would quickly diminish if there was no stability in the regions.²

According to Checchi & Company Consulting, Inc., the independent consulting firm that was responsible for the program evaluation of AREAF, since its inception in 1992, AREAF program activities have been performed in many countries with varying

¹Press Briefing by National Security Advisory Sandy Berger, Administrator of AID Brian Atwood, and Secretary of Transportation Rodney Slater <http://www.whitehouse.gov/Africa/19980320-5382.html> 20 March 1998.

²Ibid.

degrees of success. The impact of the programs is often intangible, but AREAF partners are convinced that through providing technical and election monitoring services, the organization has had a substantial influence on the development of African strategies that can eventually lead to democratic transition.³ However, added Checchi, although AREAF has contributed to free and fair elections it would be unrealistic to expect that AREAF projects will be able to create new democratic institutions and orientations.⁴

Recommendations

In all cases AREAF observers worked diligently with local civic and human rights groups, however, attempts to include a higher concentration on students, and training via workshops and seminars for rural areas where the need for civic and voter education is most needed should be attempted. Inclusion of this population would be beneficial to the advancement of a democratic society. This can be done through a small reduction in the number of international observers and travel and per diem and by the use of domestic observers as well as observers from neighboring democratic countries to train as well as monitor elections.

³Final Report, 238-39.

⁴Ibid.

Appendix: Africa Regional Electoral Assistance Fund

ID	Country	Population	Transitional-Ideal Type	Type of Assistance Provided	Elections	Election Date	Appropriate Funds	Unit of Cost Per Election	Monitoring Agency	Number of Observers
1	CAMEROON	11.5m	Civil Society	Interm	Pres	11-Oct-92	\$249,515.00	\$249,515.00	NDI	19
2	GUINEA	5.6m	Civil Society	Interm	Leg & Pres	19-Dec-93	\$586,839.00	\$586,839.00	IRI	32
3	BUGER	8m		Interm	Pres1 & Pres2	14 Feb 93; 26-2	\$439,235.00	\$219,617.00	NDI	6
4	TOGO	2.7m	Civil Society	Interm	Leg & Pres	25-Oct-95	\$420,000.00	\$420,000.00	NDI	7
5	CAR	2.7m	Institutional	Interm	Leg & Pres	17-Oct-95	\$154,748.00	\$154,748.00	NDI	2
6	RWANDA	7.2m		Basic	Leg & Pres	indelinitely	\$125,000.00	\$125,000.00	NDI,IRI	7
7	GHANA	12.3m	Institutional	Full	Leg & Pres	03 Nov 92;03	\$452,822.00	\$225,411.00	CCEU	13
8	NAMIBIA	1.3m	Strategic	Interm	Reg & Local	30 Nov 92;03	\$359,000.00	\$359,000.00	NDI	10
9	KENYA	24.8m	Institutional	Basic	Leg & Pres	29-Dec-92	\$1,044,914.00	\$1,044,914.00	IRI,AAI	54
10	ERITREA	2m	Civil Society	Interm	Referendum	23-25 Apr 92	\$465,470.00	\$465,470.00	AAI	17
11	DJIBOUTI	5.2m	Civil Society	Basic	Leg & Pres	18 Dec 92; 07	\$35,240.00	\$17,620.00	AAI	2
12	SENEGAL	6.8m	Civil Society	Interm	Leg & Pres	17 Feb 93;09 M	\$559,029.00	\$279,514.50	NDI	42
13	MADAGASCA	12m	Civil Society	Interm	Leg & Pres	93	\$538,530.00	\$179,510.00	AAI	14
14	LOSOTHO	17m	Civilian	Basic	Pre-Asses Only	27-Mar-93	\$149,756.00	\$149,756.00	IRI	6
15	TANZANIA	25m	Civil Society	Interm	Municipal&Leg	Oct 94;Oct 95	\$109,755.00	\$54,877.00	IRI	5
16	CHAD	6.2m	Civil Society	Basic	Leg & Pres	Apr-95	\$20,000.00	\$20,000.00	AAI	2
17	BENIN	4.8m	Civil Society	Interm	Local,Nat.,Pres	1995;1995;1995	\$690,433.00	\$230,144.00	NDI	43
18	BURUNDI	5.6m	Civil Society	Full	Leg & Pres	Mar 94;Sep 95	\$431,021.00	\$215,510.00	NDI	20
19	GUINEA BISS	1m	Institutional	Interm	Leg & Pres	7-Jul-94	\$237,605.00	\$237,605.00	IRI	12
20	CONGO	1.8m	Civil Society	Basic	Leg#2(repeat)	1993	\$128,885.00	\$42,961.00	AAI	4
21	GABON	1m	Civil Society	Basic	Leg & Pres	5-Dec-93	\$364,666.00	\$364,666.00	AAI,NDI	19
22	UGANDA	16m	Civil Society	Full	Cons Assembly	28 Mar 94; June 96	\$1,280,477.00	\$640,223.00	AAI,NDI	19
23	SIERRA LEO	4m	Civilian Rule	Basic	Leg, Pres Reg	Mar-96	\$577,748.00	\$192,582.00	AAI	8
24	MALI	8m	Civil Society	Interm	Assessment	Feb-96	\$198,534.00	\$198,534.00	NDI	14
25	CAPE VERDE	308000		Interm	Technical Assist	2-Feb-96	\$170,534.00	\$170,534.00	AAI	11
26	COTE d'IVOIR	13.6m	Civil Society	Basic	Leg	15 Apr 95; Oct95;	\$1,087,306.00	\$362,435.00	AAI,NDI	47
27	MOZAMBIQU	17.4m	Civil Society	Interm	Pres	28-30 Oct 94	\$175,892.00	\$175,892.00	AAI	12
28	ZAMBIA	7.8m	Civil Society	Interm	Political Party	Mar 96; 16 Apr	\$576,528.00	\$192,176.00	NDI	15
29	MAFRAWI	8.5m	Institutional	Interm	Referendum	14-Jun-93	\$61,733.00	\$61,733.00	NDI	1
30	ZIMBABWE	11m	Civil Society	Interm	Pres Leg	Mar 94; Sep 95	\$125,000.00	\$62,500.00	IRI	3
31	GAMBIA	1.2m		Basic	Regional	Apr 95; May 95	\$59,401.00	\$59,401.00	NDI	2

Source: The Final Report, Africa Regional Electoral Assistance Fund, Appendix

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

- Ake, Claude. "Rethinking African Democracy." In *The Global Resurgence of Democracy*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996.
- Babbie, Earl. *Survey Research Methods*. Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1979.
- Bratton, Michael and Goran Hyden. *Governance and Politics in Africa*. Boulder Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992.
- Bratton, Michael and Nicolas van de Walle. "Toward Governance in Africa: Popular Demands and State Responses." In *Governance and Politics in Africa*, ed. Goran Hyden and Michael Bratton. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1992.
- Bynes, Rita. *Uganda: A Country Study*. Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, 1992.
- Carothers, Thomas. *Assessing Democracy Assistance: The Case of Romania*. Washington, D.C.: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996.
- _____. *In the Name of Democracy: US Policy Toward Latin America in the Reagan Years*. Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1991.
- Dahl, Robert. *Polarchy: Participation and Opposition*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971.
- Church, R. J. Harrison. "Côte d'Ivoire" in *Africa South of the Sahara*, 27th ed. London: Europa Publications Limited, 1998.
- Diamond, Larry, Juan J. Linz and Seymore M. Lipset, ed. *Democracy in Developing Countries: Africa*, Vol. 2. Boulder: Adamantine Press Limited, 1988.
- Diamond, Larry and Marc Plattner. *The Global Resurgence of Democracy*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1996.

- Englebert, Pierre. "Côte d'Ivoire." In *Africa South of the Sahara*. London: Europa Publications Limited, 1995.
- Handloff, Robert. *Côte d'Ivoire: A Country Study*. Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, 1991.
- Huntington, Samuel P. and Clement More , ed. "Conclusion: Authoritarianism, Democracy and One-Party Politics." In *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems*. New York: Basic Books, 1970
- Huntington, Samuel P. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.
- Hadenius, Axel. *Democracy and Development*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
- Hippler, Jochen. *The Democratization of Disempowerment: The Problem of Democracy in the Third World*. London: Plato Press, 1995.
- Kirkpatrick, Jeane J. "Democratic Elections, Democratic Government, and Democratic Theory." In *Democracy at the Polls*. ed. David Butler, Howard Penniman and Austin Ranney. Washington, D. C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1981.
- Langlands, B. "Uganda." In *Africa South of the Sahara*. London: Europa Publications Limited, 1998.
- Lipset, S. M. *Political Man*. Garden City: Doubleday & Company, 1960.
- Liu, Yong-chuan. *Patterns and Results of the Third Wave*. New York: University Press of America, Inc., 1993.
- Maxon, Robert. *Struggle for Kenya*. Toronto: Associated University Press, 1993.
- MacIves, R. M. *Web of Government*. New York: MacMillan, 1947.
- McCannell, Ryan. *Legislative Strengthening: A Synthesis of USAID Experience*. Washington, D. C.: USAID Center for Development Information and Evaluation, 1995.
- Meyer, J. and M. T. Hannan. *National Development and the World System: Education, Economic and Political Change, 1950-1970*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979.

Miller, Norman and Roger Yeager. *Kenya: The Quest for Prosperity*. 2d ed. Boulder: Westview Press, 1979.

Morgan, W. "Kenya." In *Africa South of the Sahara*. 27th ed. London: Europa Publication Limited, 1998.

Nelson, Joan M. and Stephane J. Eglinton. *Global Goals, Contentions Means: Issues of Multiple Aid conditionality*. Washington, D. C.: Overseas Development Council, 1993.

O'Donnell, G. A., P. C. Schmitter and L. Whitehead, ed. *Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives*. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1986.

Ofcansky, Thomas. *Uganda: Tarnished Pearl of Africa*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1994.

Rake, Alan. "Kenya." In *Africa South of the Sahara*. 27th ed. London: Europa Publications Limited, 1998.

_____. "Uganda." In *Africa South of the Sahara*. 26th ed. London: Europa Publications Limited, 1997.

Schimpp, Michelle. *The U.S. Agency for International Development and Elections Support: A synthesis of Case Study Experiences*. Washington, D. C.: USAID Center for Development Information and Evaluation, 1993.

Snow, Donald M. and Eugene Brown. *Beyond the Water's Edge: An Introduction to U. S. Foreign Policy*. New York: St. Martin Press, 1997.

Schreder, Peter J. "Political Elites and the Process of Democratization in Africa." In *The Democratization of Disempowerment: The Problem of Democracy in the Third World*. London: Pluto Press, 1995.

Schumpeter, Joseph. *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1942.

Stephen, Alfred. "Paths Toward Redemocratization: Theoretical and Comparative Considerations." In *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives*. ed. G. A. O'Donnell, P. C. Schmitter and L. Whitehead. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1995.

Tignor, Robert. *The Colonial Transformation of Kenya*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976.

Tomasevski, Katrina K. *Development Aid and Human Rights Revisited*. London: Printer Publishers Ltd., 1993.

Journals

Bollen, K. A. "Issues in the Comparative Measurements of Political Democracy." *American Sociological Review* 5 (April 1980) : 370-390.

Carothers, Thomas. "Democracy Assistance: The Question of Strategy." *Democratization* 4, no. 3 (Autumn 1997) : 42-68.

Cheng, T. J. "Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan." *World Politics* 41, no. 4 (1989) : 471-99.

Clapham, Christopher. "Rwanda: The Perils of Peacemaking." *Journal of Peace Research* 35, no. 2 (1998) : 193-201.

_____. "Cote d'Ivoire: No Contest." *Africa Confidential* 36, no. 21 (20 October 1995): 7.

Crowder, Michael. "Whose Dream was it Anyway? Twenty-Five Years of African Independence." *African Affairs* 86, no. 342 (January 1987) : 1971-184.

Crawford, Gordan. "Foreign Aid and Political Conditionality: Issues of Effectiveness and Consistency." *Democratization* 4, no. 3 (Autumn 1997) : 69-108.

Diamond, Larry. "Beyond Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism: Strategies for Democratization." *The Washington Quarterly* (Winter 1989) : 141-163.

Grosh, Barbara and Orvis Stephen. "Democracy, Confusion or Chaos: Political Conditionality in Kenya." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 31, no. 4 (Winter 1996-97) : 46-65.

Huntington, Samuel P. "Democracy for the Long Haul." *Journal of Democracy* 7, no. 2 (April 1996) : 3-13.

Jackson, Robert H. and Carl Roseberg. "Democracy In Tropical Africa: Democracy Versus Autocracy in Africa Politics." *Journal of International Affairs* 38, no. 2 (Winter 1985) : 293-305.

- Joseph, Richard. "Africa: The Rebirth of Political Freedom." *Journal of Democracy* 2, no. 4 (Fall 1991) : 11-22.
- _____. "Kenya: A Miracle Laid Bare." *Africa Confidential* 3, no. 1 (10 January 1992) : 4.
- Monga, Celestin. "Eight Problems With African Politics." *Journal of Democracy* 8, no. 3 (July 1997) : 156-187.
- Nevitte, Neil and Sanetiago Canton. "The Role of Domestic Observer." *Journal of Democracy* 8, no. 3 (July 1997) : 17-32.
- Ntungwe Ndue, Paul. "Africa Turned Toward Pluralism." *Journal of Democracy* 5, no. 1 (January 1994) : 45-54.
- _____. "Optimism All Around." *Africa Confidential* 36, no. 7 (31 May 1995) : 7.
- Ray, James. "The Democratic Path in Peace." *Journal of Democracy* 8. No. 2 (April 1997) : 49-64.
- Rose, Richard. "Where Are Postcommunist Countries Going?" *Journal of Democracy* 8. No. 3 (July 1997) : 92-115.

Papers/Reports

- Booker, Salih. Thinking Regionally: Priorities for U.S. Policy Toward Africa. Africa Policy Information Center. Washington, D. C.: Africa Policy Information Center, 1998.
- Africa Regional Electoral Assistance Fund: A Final Report on Democracy Development Programs, Cooperative agreement No. ATO-0486-A00-2134-00. Submitted by African-American Institute, International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. 30 September 1996.
- Democracy and Human Rights. Washington, D. C.: The National Summit on Africa: Synopsis for Policy Makers, April 1998.
- Joseph, Richard. "Imperfect Transitions." in The Democratic Challenge in Africa. Paper presented at a conference at The Carter Center of Emory University. Atlanta: Georgia, 13-14 May 1994, 91-100.
- "Kenya." (Washington, D. C. International Republican Institute), 29 December 1992.

McKay, Jennifer L. "Election-Monitoring and National Sovereignty." Paper presented at the Council on Foreign Relations, 30 December 1994.

National Democratic Institute, Press of the Parliamentary Cote d'Ivoire Elections." 29 November 1995.

Perlez, Jane. "Aid for Kenya Cut as Donors Cite Corruption." *New York Times*, 21 October 1991, 1(A).

Rothchild, Donald. "Democratic Change Insurgent Action, and the Changing patterns of International-Peace Building." *The Democratic Challenges in Africa*, Discussion paper from a seminar on Democratization. The Carter Center of Emory University 13-14 May 1994, 27-38.

United States Department of State. "Uganda Human Rights Practice, 1994." Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office. 31 January 1994.

_____. "Cote d'Ivoire Human Rights Practice, 1996." Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office. 30 March 1996.